Enhancing Excellence: Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal by Pal, Sarmistha & Saha, Bibhas
Enhancing Excellence:  
Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Social motivation can promote efficiency of public service delivery though its role in 
providing schooling is little understood. We provide both theoretical and empirical insights as to why 
not-for-profit private schools could enhance excellence in schooling, using Nepal as a case study. 
Results suggest that socially motivated trust schools outperform all other types of schools irrespective 
of whether we consider standardised test scores, absolute or relative to school expenditure per student. 
Results are robust and highlight that trust school’s social objective, coupled with private financing, 
ownership and management that minimises its agency costs, is key to their value for money. 
 
 
  
 
JEL classification: H44, I22 
Keywords: Company and trust run schools, Social objectives, Profit motive, Standardised test scores, 
Test scores relative to school expenditure per student, Private school premium, Rural-urban dichotomy, 
Instrumental variable, Lagged value added model, Nepal. 
 
 
 
                                                            
* Corresponding author: Sarmistha Pal: Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Stag Hill, Guildford GU2 
7XH, Surrey, UK; E-mail: s.pal@surrey.ac.uk. Bibhas Saha, Durham University Business School, University 
of Durham, Durham DH1 3LB, UK; E-mail: b.c.saha@durham.ac.uk. Sarmistha Pal gratefully acknowledges 
the funding from Leverhulme Trust, data and related information from Saurav Bhatta and Uttam Sharma and also 
the hospitality of the Department of the Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota, where this research 
was initiated. We are much grateful to the two anonymous referees and the Manging Editor of the Journal for very 
constructive comments that helped to reshape the paper. We would like to thank Paul Glewwe for many productive 
discussions as part of the project initially and to Andrew Griffen, Javeria Qureshi, Sandra McNally, Harry 
Patrinos, Nisith Prakash, Uttam Sharma, Abhijeet Singh and Prakarsh Singh for comments and feedback on earlier 
drafts. We would also like to thank participants at the Econometric Society Asian Meeting in Singapore, Mid-
West International Economic Development Conference at Minneapolis and IZA-World Bank Employment and 
Development Conference in Bonn, Durham University Business School and Calcutta University. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
 
Enhancing Excellence: 
Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal 
 
1. Introduction 
That unselfishness and social motivation can be important drivers of many efficiency-
improving activities has long been recognised in several strands of the economic literature, such as 
charity and giving (Andreoni, 1989), agency (Besley & Ghatak, 2005), and public good provision 
(Bennett & Iossa, 2010). In developing countries, not-for-profit and other private schools co-exist with 
public schools catering to various income groups from the very rich to the very poor (Dahejia, DeLeire, 
Luttmer, & Mitchell, 2007; EdInvest, 2000; Tooly & Dixon, 2003).1  
In this context, we ask: how good are not-for-profit private schools? Can they deliver good 
secondary schooling amidst competition from other schools? Surely these are important questions, but 
remain rather underexplored especially for low-income countries. We provide both theoretical and 
empirical insights to these questions, using a unique dataset from Nepal.   
There are four types of schools in Nepal; two of them are largely run/financed by the state – 
government and partially government aided (PA in short) schools, and two are private -- trust-run and 
company-run schools. In the official nomenclature, public schools are called ‘community’ schools and 
they are of two types -- ‘aided’ and ‘unaided’. In the aided school government takes the responsibility 
of appointing and paying for teachers. In the unaided school, they provide only a grant for teachers’ 
salaries, but remains privately managed. We will call the first type fully funded ‘government’ school 
and the second type private aided (PA) school. The private unaided schools are registered as either 
‘company’ or ‘trust’ (Bhatta & Budathoki, 2013). 
The regulatory framework of education in Nepal is given by the Education Act, 2028, passed 
in 1971, which has been amended several times since then. The fifth amendment enacted in 1992 made 
way for private institutional educators’ entry, but also made a distinction between for-profit and not-
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for-profit schools (Government of Nepal, 2010). Accordingly, a private school in Nepal must register 
itself as either a (not-for-profit) trust or a profit-seeking (and tax-liable) company. The trust schools 
may have different stated objectives, tuition fees and selection criteria, but because of their common 
not-for-profit status we call them ‘socially motivated’ (see discussion in section 2). The trust schools 
are a minority. There are only 14 such schools in our sample of 122 private schools and 432 schools 
altogether (i.e. 3.2% of the total). However, these schools hold a reasonable student share – over 600 
out of a total 7000 students (i.e. 8.5%), and they are drawn from 11 districts that represent the whole of 
Nepal, covering from the Eastern Development Region and the more prosperous Central Development 
region to the remote and underdeveloped Far Western Development Region.2 
We analyse Nepal’s School Leaving Certificate (SLC) exam data of nearly 7000 students from 
432 different types of schools from 2002 to 2004 and examine if the trust school students perform 
better (or worse) than students from other schools.3 Papers most relevant to ours are McEwan and 
Carnoy (2000), Somers, McEwan, and Willms (2004), Newhouse and Beegle (2006), Desai, Dube, 
Vanneman, and Banerjee (2009), Chudgar and Quin, (2012), Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015),  
Singh (2015)4 and Thapa (2015). While these studies provide a mixed verdict on the private-versus-
public school efficiency question, none looks at the diversity of private schools with focus on not-for-
profit schools.  
Any estimation of school efficiency is fraught with school selection bias, unless school 
admissions are random. Generally, household wealth creates a bias for expensive private schools. 
Student’s ability, on the other hand, may create a bias in favour of the school that is perceived to be 
good – public or private. Newhouse and Beegle (2006) show that in Indonesia the ability bias works 
in the direction of the public schools and public schools are more efficient than private schools. A 
similar result is found for Chile by McEwan and Carnoy (2000).  Nepal’s situations are somewhat 
different as dictated by its Education Act, 2028, as people think poorly of the government schools 
(Bhatta & Budathoki, 2013). We will try to correct for the combined selection bias, but not individual 
3 
 
biases of income and ability due to data limitations.  
We develop a simple theoretical model of school choice based on which we hypothesize that 
for a low income household the choice may come down to mainly between a government school and 
a low-cost private school; the former ends up with  mostly the low ability children and the latter attracts 
the high ability children, from the poor families. At higher income levels, the choice is between 
different types of private schools. The trust schools are more likely to attract the middle class and high 
ability children, while the expensive company schools would attract rich households regardless of 
child’s ability. Although we capture some aspect of school competition in our theoretical model, we 
cannot directly incorporate that in our empirical analysis due to lack of data.  
Nevertheless, we empirically model school choice and correct for the consequent selection bias 
for determining school performance,  using the 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) method (see further 
discussion in Section 4). In our aggregate model of private versus public schools, our instrument for 
the private school is the number of private schools in the village or municipality where the child resides.  
In the disaggregate model of four school types, we have three separate village/municipality 
level IVs for PA, trust and company-run schools (government schools being the reference category). 
These are the number of private schools (for the company school), the share of the non-Hindu 
population (for the trust school), and the walking time reflecting the distance to the school (for the PA 
school). The rationale for the IVs is discussed in Section 4.3. 
We regress student’s standardised test score on the IV of the school type, after controlling for 
several student characteristics. The estimated coefficient of the school IV gives a measure of ‘absolute 
efficiency’ (AE). We also define a ‘value for money’ measure of efficiency – ‘relative efficiency’ (RE) 
– by the student (standardised) test score relative to the school expenditure per student.5 For each of the 
efficiency measures, our estimation runs on two dimensions – broader school types (i.e., public vs. 
private) and individual school types. We find that in terms of the AE scores the private schools as a 
group are far superior to the public schools regardless of whether the school selection bias is corrected 
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or not. But in terms of the RE scores private schools do not seem to be any better. The higher 
expenditure of the private schools seems to offset their test score advantage.  
But the results of the disaggregate school types are surprising. Both in terms of the AE and RE 
scores the trust school is the best school. In the AE model, the company school comes a distant second, 
followed by the government school and the PA school in that order; the PA school is significantly 
inferior to the government school. In the RE model, all other schools, except Trust schools, are equally 
inefficient. Furthermore, these school efficiency rankings are primarily driven by schools’ performance 
in rural Nepal, which is not surprising.  
Finally, for robustness we consider subject fixed effects (that allows us to exploit the student’s 
unobserved subject-level omitted factors that may influence SLC scores) and a lagged value-added 
(VA) model. The scope for a VA model arises from the fact that we observe student performance twice 
prior to the SLC exam -- in grade 9 and then in a send-off exam at grade 10. The VA model allows us 
to control for the unobserved students’ ability as well as persistence of learning (Andrabi et al., 2011).  
In all cases, the trust school remains the best school. We also show that if both the government school 
and PA school are clubbed together, our results still hold. 
 Unfortunately, given our data limitations we cannot fully explain why the trust school 
outperforms all others. We conjecture that the not-for-profit status forced the trust schools spend their 
revenues on students or teachers, which resulted in having more trained teachers and a lower pupil-
teacher ratio, both contributing to good student performance. A company school, on the other hand, 
would cut costs to increase profit. We provide some suggestive evidence in this respect. 
Our paper makes at least three contributions. (i) It shows that not-for-profit private schools can 
be an effective mode of delivering quality education in developing countries. (ii) In the case of Nepal, 
such schools appear better than both public schools and for-profit schools. (iii) Our finding is valid for 
both absolute efficiency and relative efficiency. 
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In what follows, Section 2 discusses the data and Section 3 presents the theoretical model. 
Section 4 explains the empirical strategy. In Section 5 we discuss and analyse the results while 
robustness checks are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Data and School Types 
Our dataset is taken from a national survey commissioned by the Ministry of Education of Nepal to 
assess student- and school-level determinants of SLC performances from 2002 to 2004 (Bhatta, 2005). 
We focus on students who are non-boarding and sitting in SLC for the first time.6 There are 7000 such 
students distributed over 432 schools.  
Fifty percent of our schools are government having a share of nearly 67% of the SLC students; 
the PA schools constitute 22% of the schools accounting for 18% of the students, while the company-
run schools hold a sizable share of 25% among all schools but they have only 11% of the SLC students. 
Trust schools are a minority, having a school share of 3.2% and a student share of 8.5%. The trust 
schools are drawn from 11 out of 77 districts, about 14.29% of the districts and 21% of total population 
(as per 2001 census). But more importantly these schools represent four out of five ‘development 
regions’ covering not just the prosperous Central Development Region, but also the Eastern 
Development Region and the Mahakali province of the remote underdeveloped Far Western 
Development Region.7 Eleven of the fourteen trust schools are located in the rural areas, and they 
present great variations in terms of the number of SLC students. While three schools have as many as 
75 to 98 SLC students, three other schools have as few as 5 to 9 SLC students. 
 
2.1. Comparison of various school types 
In Table 1, we summarise the key school and household characteristics. The mean aggregate raw and 
standardized scores correspond to six compulsory subjects (which include Nepalese, English, Maths 
and Science). The mean score of both the trust and the company-run schools are substantially higher 
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than the public schools. The mean relative test score is calculated by dividing the standardised test score 
by school expenditure per student. Here, the company school appears to be far ahead of the trust school.    
School fees are taken for tuition, library and examinations. We report two figures for fees – one 
inclusive of all fees including boarding expenses and another without the boarding fees. The company 
schools are far more expensive than any other schools, -- more than twice the trust schools and nearly 
six times the government school. The trust schools are three times costlier than the government school; 
they also register smallest variance in fees.8 
  Company schools are expectedly smaller in class sizes as they register the smallest pupil teacher 
ratio – 19.2:11 as opposed to 43.12:1 in government schools. They also spend the most – 6000 Rupee 
per student – 66% higher than the government school. Closely behind are the trust schools; PA schools 
are the least spender. Interestingly, the salary of the teachers is highest in the government school, twice 
that of company-run schools. The trust schools also pay well to the teachers.  
We also see that richer and educated households tend to prefer company schools and the least 
educated and poorest households prefer the PA schools, as predicted in our theoretical model. The 
proportion of the lowest caste (Dalit) is highest in the government schools and lowest in the company 
schools. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of key school and household characteristics 2002-04 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables 
Govt. 
schools PA schools Trust schools 
Company 
schools  
 School characteristics 
Mean aggregate (raw) test scores 373.46 370.83 487.13 489.39 
 (81.70) (90.57) (112.95) (83.29) 
Mean aggregate standardized test 
scores -0.10 -0.13 1.04 1.06 
 (0.82) (0.91) (1.13) (0.84) 
Mean aggregate relative 
standardized test scores  -0.20  -0.51 0.05 0.77 
 (1.45) (5.31) (1.91) (0.63) 
Mean annual expenditure per 
student (000 Rupees) * 3.87 2.65 5.36 6.00 
 (5.51) (2.72) (5.32) (3.844) 
Mean annual school fee (in 
rupees)  1842 3170 5316 12153 
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 (5000) (9048) (4644) (17471) 
Mean annual school fee (day 
school) 1499 2511 4978 11594  
(3420) (6863) (3778) (25433) 
Mean annual salary of teacher 
(000 Rupees) 117.13 80.09 85.86 53.75 
 (231.17) (43.90) (71.13) (20.00) 
Mean share of teacher’s salary in 
total expenditure 0.82 0.83 0.68 0.74 
 (0.21) (0.47) (0.15) (0.24) 
Mean pupils per teacher* 43.12 43.42 25.72 19.21 
 (22.98) (21.49) (9.66) (3.59) 
Parent-teacher associations 0.61  0.80 0.31 0.25 
 (0.49) (0.40) (0.46) (0.01) 
Share of schools in total schools 0.50 0.22 0.03 0.25 
Share of schools in total students 0.67 0.18 0.04 0.11 
 Household characteristics 
Father’s schooling (years) 8.83 8.09 10.02  11.10 
 (13.75) (13.63) (14.51) (11.84) 
Mother’s schooling (years) 2.77 2.06 3.94 6.32 
 (8.77) (8.18) (9.60) (10.88) 
Log(cash income) 1.685 1.683 1.77 1.90 
 (0.57) (0.54) (0.59) (0.62) 
Dalit 0.04 0.034 0.02 0.01 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.11) 
Source: Sample data, our own calculation. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
* To arrive at these figures, we take account of all students of the schools (not just year ten). Note that 
annual school fee includes fees on admission, readmission, tuition, library and examination.  
 
2.2 Social motivation of trust schools 
An important question is how to ascertain that the ‘trust’ schools are socially motivated. There are three 
ways the present day ‘trust’ schools could come into existence. One is new entry; some schools were 
set up after 1992 with the clear intent to be different from the ‘company’ schools; there are three such 
trust schools in our sample. If these new schools wanted to be profit-motivated they could have 
registered as ‘company’. Moreover, if the trust status was a convenient disguise to make profit, we 
would have seen faster growth of trust schools than the company schools. But that is not the case.    
The second way of gaining the status of a trust school is historical; some schools were started 
by philanthropist or missionaries during 1980s or earlier; a natural transition for them after 1992 was 
the trust status. The third way some schools became trust schools is simply by the force of regulation. 
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The Education Act, 2028 clearly specifies that a previously unregistered private school must be given 
the status of a trust, and not company, if it had been running on a government or publicly owned or 
‘privately donated’ building or land (Government of Nepal, 2010, pp. 7-8).   
Some examples: We now present a few examples of the trust schools from our sample. 
 (i) Lalitpur Madhyamik Vidhyalay, a mixed gender English medium secondary school, was 
founded in 1981. As the school’s website says, it aims to offer quality education at low cost.9 It admits 
150 poor children free of charge every year, and also offers scholarship to 45 girl students from poor 
families thanks to assistance from a foreign NGO. In 2004, it had 98 students appearing for the SLC 
exam and 60% of its teachers were trained teachers. The same year the school’s monthly (average) 
tuition fee was Rs 900, roughly 25% of the average tuition fee of the trust schools in our sample.   
 (ii) Mahesh Sanskrit Gurukul, a Hindu religious school that professes to emphasise on ancient 
Sanskrit and Vedic literatures along with modern subjects was established in 1993 by a Hindu guru. It 
is an all-boys school and run primarily on private donations. Note that this school was started after 
1992, and it could not have possibly chosen to be a company school.  
(iii) There is another category of trust schools that were set up by NGOs. From our sample, we 
mention two such schools -- Prabhat English Higher Secondary School and Siddhi Ganesh Higher 
Secondary School. The former was set up in 1990 by a group of social workers and educationists 
ostensibly to create ‘one graduate in every family of Bhaktapur (where the school is located)’.10 In 2004 
its monthly tuition fee was merely Rs 1925 and it had a pupil-teacher ratio of 5.9. The second school, 
run by a foreign NGO, charges a very small tuition fee – only Rs 150 per month. 
Since 10 out of 14 trust schools in our sample are in the rural areas, we needed to ensure that 
the characteristics of the rural households (e.g., parental schooling, income, wealth and caste)11 do not 
correlate with the characteristics of the trust school. We have verified that the household characteristics 
from the villages which have trust schools are no different to the household characteristics from those 
villages which do not have trust schools (see endnote 11). 
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We also find that presence of both the trust and company schools are negatively correlated with 
the total test score of the government schools, which suggests their responsiveness to demand.12 
However, unlike the company schools the trust schools responded mainly in the rural areas where 
incomes are low. This supports our hypothesis that the trust schools are socially motivated.  
 
Trust school characteristics. We now compare the essential characteristics of company and trust 
schools with a view to further identify any other aspects of social motivation. Table 2 shows the linear 
probit estimates of trust vs company schools. Relative to company schools, trust schools are likely to 
be older. Trust schools vary in their age from 5 to 49 years. Their average age is 32 years while the 
average age of the company schools is 15 years.13 The trust school also hires significantly more trained 
teachers, have a lower pupil-teacher ratio and are more likely to be headed by its founder.  
 Table 2. Comparison of trust and company school characteristics 
 (1) All (2) Urban (3) Rural 
VARIABLES Trust school Trust school Trust school 
    
School’s age  0.00563*** 0.0107*** 0.00236*** 
 (0.000792) (0.00146) (0.000814) 
Founder as head 0.177*** 0.165*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0218) (0.0275) 
Pupils per teacher  -0.00280*** -0.00677*** 0.00145** 
 (0.000795) (0.00113) (0.000631) 
Has parent-teacher 
association  
0.0285 0.0364 -0.0362** 
 (0.0176) (0.0280) (0.0160) 
Has trained teachers 0.491*** 0.526*** 0.361*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0389) (0.0875) 
Rural  -0.0397***   
 (0.0118)   
Constant -0.124*** -0.114*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0312) (0.0409) 
VDC dummies Yes Yes Yes 
SLC year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,509 1,567 942 
R-squared 0.497 0.442 0.807 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This regression is run only on 
the subsample of trust and company schools for the sample over 2002-04; the dummy for Trust 
school=1 if it is a trust school and 0 for company schools, thus ignoring other school types of schools.  
 
10 
 
Next, Appendix Table 2A considers the estimates of the effects of the school types on the school 
expenditure (columns 1 and 2) and the teachers’ salary (columns 3 and 4), after controlling for several 
school characteristics as in Table 2. Compared to the government school, the expenditure per student 
is significantly higher in the trust school.  
To further verify the trust school’s focus on academic performance, we estimate the probability 
of a trust school student’s progression to higher education. Our data contain information about post-
SLC destination to higher study or work. About 73% of the (non-boarding) students, who passed SLC 
at the first attempt, chose to study further. We determine the linear probability of studying further, after 
completing the SLC. These estimates are summarised in Appendix Table 2B and show that the trust 
school students are more likely than any other students to continue studying post-SLC. 
 
3. A theoretical model of school choice 
Consider a representative household with one child and four schools to choose from – one government 
school (suffixed G), and three types of private schools of which one is a trust school (suffixed R) and 
two others are company schools.14 One of them is high-cost (suffixed C) and the other is low-cost 
(suffixed P). The cost of attending school G is FG, which we assume to be small. School P entails a 
slightly higher fee FP. Likewise, the fees of school T and C are FR and FC, respectively. We assume 
that fees are given and FG<FP<FR<FC.  
The household’s income is Y, and the child’s ability is a. The economy-wide income distribution 
is given by some distribution function. Ability is random -- either high (aH) or low (aL). There is no 
correlation between income and ability. The household knows its income and the child’s ability. 
The household values consumption and child’s test score’s t, which is random and follows a 
cumulative distribution function Hs (s = G, P, R, C) with density hi, sensitive to the school type and the 
child’s ability. The support of the test score distribution is [0, 1]. The household’s expected utility from 
choosing school s (s=G, P, T, C) for the child with ability aj (j=H, L) is given by  
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ܧݑ௦൫ܻ; ௝ܽ൯ ൌ ׬ ܿݐ	݄௦݀ݐ ൌ ׬ ሺܻ െ ܨ௦ሻݐ݄௦݀ݐଵ଴ ൌ ሺܻ െ
ଵ
଴ ܨ௦ሻ ׬ ݐ݄௦݀ݐ	
ଵ
଴ ൌ ሺܻ െ ܨ௦ሻ߬௦௝   (1) 
In equation (1) we have substituted the budget constraint Y=c+Fs, and with deterministic consumption, 
the household’s (indirect) expected utility becomes a linear function of the expected test score, s j.   
 
Government school. We assume that the average test score G of school G does not vary with the 
child’s ability or school’s expenditure (xG). This assumption conforms to the general perception that 
the state schools fail the high ability students.  
Low-cost company school. School P does better than the government school in the sense that it 
produces a higher expected test score for the high ability child. Specifically, we assume PH > G > PL. 
The low cost private school helps the high ability students perform better, but possibly at the expense 
of their weaker cohorts.  
Trust school. School R charges a much higher fee than school P. It can spend more and it can scale up 
student-specific assistance in a significant way.15 Therefore, the expected test score is higher for both 
high and low ability child for both G and P, and ߬ோு ൐ ߬ோ௅ ൐ ߬ீ	, డఛೃడ௫ೃ ൐ 0.  
High-cost company school. School C has similar effects on the expected test scores like the trust 
school, i.e. ߬஼ு ൐ ߬஼௅ ൐ ߬ீ and 		డఛ಴డ௫಴ ൐ 0, because of its large resource base. But it also offers something 
else – a status good. The expected utility of choosing school C is ܧݑ஼ ൌ ሺܻ െ ܨ஼ሻ߬஼ ൅ ݖܻ.  
 
School choice. Choice between school P and school G. Suppose a household’s income is at least FP, 
and contemplates choosing between school G and P. For a low ability child, the household will clearly 
choose school G, for the lower cost and higher expected score. For a high ability child, the story is 
different; it will choose school P, if ሺܻ െ ܨ௉ሻ߬௉ு ൐ ሺܻ െ ீܨ ሻ߬ீ	, i.e. if its income exceeds a critical 
level 
ଵܻ ൌ ிುఛು
ಹି	ிಸఛಸ
ఛುಹି	ఛಸ
.            (2) 
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Choice between school P and school R. Suppose the same household, i.e. of child ability aH, can also 
afford school R. Will it choose school R or P? School R is chosen if ሺܻ െ ܨோሻ߬ோு ൐ ሺܻ െ ܨ௉ሻ߬௉ு, i.e. if 
its income exceeds  
ଶܻு ൌ ிೃఛೃ
ಹି	ிುఛುಹ
ఛೃಹି	ఛುಹ
.            (3) 
It can be checked that if Y2H> Y1 if (FR - FP) is sufficiently greater than (FP - FG). 
Choice between school R and school C. What if the same household’s income exceeds FC? Assuming 
z + CH > RH, we derive the critical level of Y, say Y3H, above which the household will choose school 
C instead of school R: 
ଷܻு ൌ ி಴ఛ಴
ಹି	ிೃఛೃಹ
௭ା	ఛ಴ಹି	ఛೃಹ
.            (4) 
Assuming FC and z sufficiently large and CH not too smaller than RH, we can ensure that Y3H>Y2H. 
 
To summarise the above discussion, if the child is of high ability, the household will switch from the 
government to the low-cost company school, and then to the trust school and eventually to the high-
cost company school, as the household gets progressively richer.  
 
What if the child has low ability? The choice between school R and C is determined in the same way 
as above. We derive analogously   
ଷܻ௅ ൌ ி಴ఛ಴
ಽି	ிೃఛೃಽ
௭ା	ఛ಴ಽି	ఛೃಽ
.                                                            (5) 
 Above this income level the household will choose school C. Below this critical level, the household 
will consider choosing between R and school G. Mind that school P will never be chosen for the low 
ability child. We derive a new critical income level Y2L:  
 ଶܻ௅ ൌ ிೃఛೃ
ಽି	ிಸఛಸ
ఛೃಽି	ఛಸ
.                                         (6)   
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Households (of a low ability child) with ܻ ∈ ሺ ଶܻ௅, ଷܻ௅ሻ will choose the trust school and with ܻ ∈ ሾܻீ , ଶܻ௅ሿ 
will choose the government school. 
For a low ability child, the choice is somewhat ‘limited’. The choice is either the low-cost and 
low-quality government school, or a high quality but expensive trust or company school.  
Furthermore, we can ascertain that Y2H< Y2L. That is, when the child’s ability is low switching 
to the costly trust school would occur at a much higher level of income.16 However, we cannot ascertain 
whether Y3H<, or > Y3L. Both are possible. If Y3H> Y3L, the trust school would draw high ability students 
from a wider range of households, (Y3H -Y2H).  
 We summarise the following, which will be helpful for our empirical work. 
(1) Higher income would lead to selection of company schools. Higher ability of the child will also 
lead to selection against the government school, but between the trust and company schools the 
bias may go either way. At low levels of income, however, the ability bias would go from the 
government to (low cost) company school.  
(2) High ability students are more likely to be distributed across all types of private schools. But 
the low ability students are likely to be will be either in government schools, or in expensive 
private schools. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy  
4.1 Test score determination 
We assume the following education production function, which is standard in the literature: 
௜ܶ௦ ൌ ܶሺݏܿ௦, ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜௦       (7) 
where Tis is the test score of student i in school s, scs is a vector of the characteristics of the student’s 
school s, and fci are the family/individual characteristics of student i, and u is the random noise varying 
across s and i. To relate this to our theoretical model, Tis is a realisation of the variable ts, and the 
expected score sj is a conditional expectation (conditional on ability) of Tis. Also, note that in our 
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empirical model all company schools are treated as a homogenous category, which was not the case in 
our theoretical model. There are some low-cost company schools in our sample. The lowest annual fee 
for a company school is Rs 880 which fit the description of a low-cost company school.   
Since scs and fci are not fully observed, their unobserved components will end up in the error 
term causing our result biased, we proxy scs by a homogenous private school dummy variables S0 
(keeping the combined government and PA schools as the base) to capture the effect of various 
unaccounted and unobservable school characteristics. This gives equation (8) as  
௜ܶ௦ ൌ ܶሺܵ଴, ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜௦ .       (8) 
We extend equation (8) to the case of full diversity of schools, by replacing S0 by three dummies 
for the company, trust and PA schools as S1, S2 and S3 respectively, keeping the government school as 
the reference category, and write the disaggregated version of equation (8) as 
௜ܶ௦ ൌ ܨሺ ଵܵ௜, ܵଶ௜, ܵଷ௜, ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜௦      (9) 
Finally, we linearize equations (8) and (9) respectively as 
௜ܶ௦ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵܵ଴௜ ൅ ߛሺ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜     (10) 
௜ܶ௦௞ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ଵܵ௜ ൅ ܾଶܵଶ௜ ൅ ܾଷܵଷ௜ ൅ ߛሺ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜    (11) 
The parameters a1, b1, b2, and b3 yield the estimates of absolute efficiency (AE), where efficiency is 
measured by the marginal gain in total standardised score (aggregated over six compulsory subjects) 
for each school type. We also define relative efficiency (RE) as Tis/Sx, where Sx is per capita expenditure 
of the school. In our theoretical model, we did not discuss RE for the sake of economy.  
4.2 School Choice and test score determination 
The OLS estimates of a1, b1, b2, and b3 are likely to be biased as unobservable factors may correlate 
school choice with test scores, making the school dummies endogenous. Hence, we try to correct for 
endogeneity using the two-stage IV method.  
In the first stage, we model school choice by introducing instrument(s). For the aggregate school 
types model, the school choice is given by  
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௜ܻ௦∗ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵݖ௜௦ ൅ ߙଶ ௜ܹ ൅ ݁௜௦     (12) 
For any given type of school s, the dependent variable Y* is unobservable, but it is related to the 
observable variable S0, which takes a value 1 if the student goes to a private school, and zero otherwise. 
For the disaggregate school types model, Y* depends on Ss, which is equal to 1, if s=1,2,3 as defined 
before, and 0 otherwise.  The set of variables, W refers to a set of individual (e.g. gender, age) and 
household characteristics (e.g. parents' education, income and caste). But the key identifying variable 
of interest is z, which is our instrument for school choice and it is going to be different for different 
school types.  
Next, using the first stage estimates of individual school choice regressions, we predict the value 
of the potentially endogenous variables and replace the school dummy by the predicted value. That is, 
we replace S0i by SIVi in equation (10), and  ଵܵ௜, ܵଶ௜, ܵଷ௜ in equation (11) by ଵܵூ௏௜	, ܵଶூ௏௜	 and ܵଷூ௏௜, 
respectively. The final equations for obtaining the IV estimates are:  
Homogenous private schools:   ௜ܶ௦ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ ூܵ௏௜ ൅ ߠሺ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜    (13) 
Heterogeneous private schools:  ௜ܶ௦௞ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ଵܵூ௏௜ ൅ ܾଶܵଶூ௏௜ ൅ ܾଷܵଷூ௏௜ ൅ 	ߛሺ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜ (14) 
While equations (13) and (14) refer to the determination of test scores with a view to determine AE, 
we also estimate the corresponding equations for determining RE.  
 
4.3. Instruments 
For the aggregate school model, our instrument (z in equation (12)) is the number of private schools in 
the VDC of the child’s home.17 The variation in the number of private schools in the VDC captures the 
scope of choosing a suitable school, as the private school expansion in Nepal during our study period 
primarily was a response to growing demand, rather than a reflection of quality competition (i.e. better 
teaching and test scores) amongst schools. Even if schools competed on admission, extending the 
competition all the way to the SLC exam is unlikely, because the SLC exam would occur in five (and 
in many instances ten) years after the child’s admission. Changing school midway is rare, even if the 
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student finds herself struggling. Thus, the number of private schools is unlikely to be correlated with 
individual student’s test score. Indeed, our econometric test of exogeneity of the instrument confirms 
this. Another potential concern is that the location of private schools may correlate with local household 
characteristics. We do not think that is the case, because Nepal (like other South Asian countries) do 
not have a school catchment area policy, and private schools locate in areas with good transport link 
(Pal, 2010), religious significance (in case of faith schools) or favoured by government policy (Caddell, 
2007a). Figure 1 in Appendix explains the relevance of our chosen instruments.  
For the disaggregate school model, our instruments are the number of private schools in the VDC 
for company-run schools, the share of non-Hindu population in the VDC for trust-run school and 
average VDC-level walking time from home to school for the PA school choice. The rationale for the 
company school IV is same as the above given in the aggregate school model.  
For the trust school, the population share of the religious minorities (i.e., the non-Hindus) has a 
negative effect on the likelihood of its choice (Figure 1). Historically, many trust schools were set up 
by Hindu philanthropists, thus introducing a pro-Hindu leaning, which in turn might have discouraged 
the minorities (Caddell, 2007a, 2007b). Even when the trust school founders are fully secular, the trust 
school would appeal for their liberal outlooks more to the secular section of the majority community 
than the minorities.  
One likely concern is whether the religious minorities have lower academic performance in general, 
as is seen in neighbouring India. In our sample, 92% of the students are Hindu, and they score slightly 
less on average than non-Hindus.18 Given a likely (but somewhat weak) negative correlation between 
Hindu identity and test scores, our estimate is likely to under-estimate the effect of trust school choice 
on student performance. So, we test the IV validity econometrically. 
For the PA school, we think the competition here is more with the government school. The most 
likely scenario is that when one is priced out of the private schools, one’s choice is between PA and 
government school, and the distance to school is likely to be important. If the local government school 
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is oversubscribed, a student may need to walk longer to attend a PA school.  Hence, there will be a 
positive relation between the distance and PA school choice, which we observe beyond a minimum 
walking time 0.4 hour (Figure 1) and also econometrically. Furthermore, households typically do not 
relocate to avail good schools. Hence, distance to the school would be exogenous to test scores, which 
is also econometrically corroborated.  
Control variables. We pool observations for three years 2002-04 and take only one observation 
per student at their first appearance in the SLC exam. As such, all standard errors are clustered at the 
school level to minimise autocorrelation of errors, if any. We include characteristics of the child (male, 
age, square of age, if received any peer help, ‘no grade repetition in year 9’, which is an approximate 
measure of ability), years of schooling of each parent, log of annual cash earnings of the household, 
castes (Janajati, Dalit, Chhetri) and the rural/urban residence. We also include dummies for the SLC 
years and the districts to account for the unobserved SLC year-level (i.e., exam papers, marking etc.) 
and district-level factors that may affect test scores.  Note that the set of instruments zs are excluded 
from the final equations (13) and (14).  
Our tests of exclusion restrictions (see Section 5) validate the argument that these IVs do not 
influence SLC test scores directly. Further the Hansen J-statistics for over-identification test indicate 
that the test score equation is exactly identified. 
To control for the unobserved parental preferences on school choice and student performance, 
we ideally needed a household fixed effects model. But we were unable to do this as we do not have 
SLC information for all the siblings living in a household over the sample years 2002-04. Hence, we 
control for all observable and relevant parental characteristics including education, income and caste, 
residential location (rural/urban) to account for parental school choice.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Determinants of school choice  
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At the first stage of our estimation, we identify the determinants of school choice equation (12) using 
a linear probability model. For the baseline model of public-versus-private school choice, the key 
identifying variable is the number of private schools in the VDC.19 Our linear probability model uses a 
whole range of school, household and student characteristics as well as dummies for district and SLC 
years. The resultant marginal effects of the main variables of interest are shown in Table 3 column 1. 
We see that the number of private schools in a VDC positively affects the choice of a private school 
(trust or company), thus justifying its relevance as an IV.  
Among the household characteristics, household income and parental education – especially 
mother’s education, are expectedly significant determinants of private school choice. Higher ability 
(captured by ‘no repetition of grade 9’) and being a male student favour the choice of a private school.  
Next, we extend the school choice model to individual school types, where the probability of 
each type of school’s choice is estimated against the choice of all other schools combined. Columns (2) 
- (4) of Table 3 report these estimates. Significantly, a higher income creates a positive selection bias 
for the company school, but a negative (weakly significant) bias for the trust school. This is consistent 
with our theoretical prediction; in comparative terms between a trust school and any other school, which 
includes the company schools as well, the preference would be away from the trust school. This is also 
because trust schools may offer scholarship to poor families. As for ability, we cannot say much, 
because ‘no repetition of grade 9’ is a very weak measure of ability. Except for the company schools, 
there is no gender bias in school selection. All the IVs have significant effects on the respective school 
choice, thus establishing their relevance for each school type choice.  
Table 3. Linear probability estimates of school choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pvt Sch. Company Sch. Trust Sch. PA Sch. 
     
Number of Pvt Sch. 0.0117*** 0.0328***   
 (0.00266) (0.00235)   
Non-Hindu pop. share    -0.243***  
   (0.0362)  
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Time to walk to Sch.    0.000442** 
    (0.000183) 
Constant 0.840*** 0.466*** 0.307*** 0.00732 
 (0.778) (0.0683) (0.0445) (0.0907) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,070 7,070 7,573 7,573 
R-squared 0.301 0.244 0.172 0.171 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Other controls include individual gender, age, age square, binary indicators of health problems, peer 
help and grade repetition in year 9, each parent’s schooling years, annual income, castes (Janajati, 
Dalit, Chhetri) and a dummy for rural regions.  
 
The effect of School Choice on School Performance: Absolute efficiency measure  
Homogeneous private Schools: In Table 4 we report the school effects for the aggregate model of 
private and public schools (as in equation 13). In column 1 we have the OLS estimate of the school 
effect, which shows that private schools yield 0.009 higher test scores than public schools. The IV 
estimates presented in column 2 show that the private school effect (after correction) is much larger; 
on average private school students score 0.039 higher than those in government schools, suggesting a 
negative (overall) selection bias.20  
Table 4. Non-IV and IV estimates of efficiency: Homogeneous private schools 
 (1) Non-
IV 
(2) IV (3) Non-IV (4) IV 
VARIABLES AE AE RE RE 
     
Pvt Sch. 0.009***  0.004**  
 (0.001)  (0.002)  
IV Pvt Sch.  0.039*  0.035 
  (0.021)  (0.034) 
Constant 0.031*** 0.003 0.040*** 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.018) (0.006) (0.028) 
Other controls [1] Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District & Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV exclusion test: F(p-
value) 
 0.00(1.00)  0.00(1.00) 
Observations 6,188 5,828 6,188 5,828 
R-squared 0.471 0.390 0.341 0.130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
For ‘Other controls’ see note to Table 3. 
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In this context, it is important to test the validity of the IV exclusion restrictions: z satisfies the 
exclusion condition if cov(z, u)=0 in equation (13) for homogenous private schools case. The latter 
requires that z is uncorrelated with the disturbance, u in equation (13), i.e. z has no explanatory power 
with respect to Ti, after conditioning on other x’s. It is difficult to test this condition directly because u 
is unobservable; we develop a test using the estimated residuals for student performance equation (13) 
which is reported in Table 4. Clearly the relevant F-statistic is low with a very high p-value, thus 
allowing us to accept the null hypothesis that IV, the number of private schools in the vicinity of the 
chosen school of the student, is not statistically significant to explain the estimated residuals of the test 
score regression (13). This validates the exclusion restriction of the IV.  
 
Heterogeneous Private Schools. Next, we present the estimates of the effects of individual school 
types (equation (14)) in Table 5. From the OLS estimates (column 1) we see that the trust schools are 
the best, closely followed by the company-run schools, while the PA schools are no different from the 
government school. From the IV estimates (column 2), which correct for the selection bias, we see that 
the efficiency gaps between the schools drastically widens. The trust school stays on top yielding 0.06 
higher test scores than the government school, and 0.046 higher than the company school. The PA 
school is significantly worse than the government school. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show the rural-urban diversity. It is not surprising to see that the 
national efficiency ranking is mainly driven by the rural sector, whereas in the urban sector the two 
private schools are no different from the government school. As has been widely discussed in the 
development literature government schools are often plagued with various inefficiencies, and in rural 
areas the problem is far worse.  
Table 5. Estimates of absolute efficiency (AE) – heterogeneous private schools 
 (1) All (2) All (3) Rural (4) Urban 
VARIABLES     
PA Sch. 0.001    
 (0.001)    
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Company Sch. 0.009***    
 (0.001)    
Trust Sch. 0.010***    
 (0.002)    
IV PA Sch.  -0.038*** -0.028** -0.035* 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.021) 
IV Company Sch.  0.014* 0.025*** 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) 
IV Trust Sch.  0.060*** 0.051*** 0.031 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.034) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.031*** 0.013** 0.012** 0.030** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) 
District & SLC year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV exclusion test: F(p-
value) 
- 0.00(1.00) 1.43 (0.24) 0.55 (0.65) 
IV over-id p-value Hansen 
J-stat[1] 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 6,188 5,828 3,974 1,854 
R-squared 0.472 0.400 0.383 0.420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. [1] Hansen J-stat of 0 
indicates that the equation is exactly identified. 
Why do the trust schools perform better than the company schools? We do not have a definitive 
explanation. But we may speculate based on our analysis of Table 2 and Appendix Table 2A that the 
social motivation of trust schools driving them to choose a lower pupils-teacher ratio, hire better trained 
teachers and hold parent-teacher meetings more frequently, which in turn are helping students perform 
better. Second, head teachers are more likely to be the founders of trust schools, which help reduce the 
scope of agency problems. In sum, the trust school may be able to combine private financing and 
management with the goal of promoting better education. 
 
5.2. School effects: Relative efficiency 
Examining the data on expenditure we see that although the trust and company schools spend a similar 
amount of money per student, their composition of inputs on which the money is spent is vastly 
different. As noted above, compared to the company schools, the trust schools pay more to the teacher, 
have better trained teachers and spend more on learning infrastructure, even though their tuition fee is 
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lower. Clearly, to the parents which school is value for money is an important question. 
 Our RE estimates for the aggregate model are reported in Table 4 columns 3 and 4. Here the 
picture is however different to the AE estimates. The private schools as a group does not fare better 
than the public schools (IV estimates in column 4). The absolute score advantage of the private schools 
is just offset by the high fees they charge. 
 Table 6. IV estimates of relative efficiency (RE) – heterogeneous private schools 
 (1) All (2) All (3) Rural (4) Urban 
VARIABLES     
PA Sch. 0.003    
 (0.002)    
Company Sch. 0.007***    
 (0.002)    
Trust Sch. 0.001    
 (0.004)    
IV PA Sch.  -0.010 -0.020 0.030 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.039) 
IV Company Sch.  0.013 0.008 0.025** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
IV Trust Sch.  0.086*** 0.096*** -0.005 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.048) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.040*** 0.007 0.020* 0.020 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) 
District/SLC year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV exclusion test: 
F(p-value) 
 0.00 (1.00) 0.19 (0.91) 1.18 (0.31) 
IV over-id Hansen J 
stat[1] 
 0.00 0.00 0.00[1] 
Observations 6,188 5,828 3,974 1,854 
R-squared 0.344 0.134 0.136 0.176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] Hansen J-stat of 0 indicates that the equation is exactly identified. 
However, that is not the whole picture. There is a significant difference between the trust school and 
the company-run school on this. Individual school IV estimates, as reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
6, show that it is only the trust school that is ‘value for money’. After adjusting for the money spent per 
pupil, trust schools account for 0.086 higher score than the government school. Company schools are 
no better than the government school in relative efficiency unit. 
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  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 show the rural-urban split of RE estimates. The superiority of the 
trust school holds only in the rural areas, as was the case also with the AE scores. The company school, 
on the other hand, is superior only in urban areas, but not in the rural areas or nationally. Combining 
the national as well as the rural and urban pictures one can regard trust schools as good value for money 
overall, while the same cannot be said about the company schools.   
 
6. Robustness check 
We now try to rule out several competing explanations. 
 Both types of public schools clubbed together. One may argue that the government school and the 
PA school are just two variants of the public school, and their separation may influence the estimates. 
To examine this possibility, we club these two schools together, as we did in our aggregate model, but 
differentiate between the trust and company schools. Table A1 in Appendix presents both the OLS and 
IV estimates of AE and RE scores. As can be seen from the IV estimates (columns 2 and 4) that the 
trust school comes out as the best school of the three types of school. Relative to the base category of 
the (aggregate) public school, a trust school student scores 5.434, which is higher than what a company 
school student scores (2.136). However, the difference between the two private schools is significantly 
less when it comes to RE scores. 
 
Persistence of learning. It is important to examine if the relative superiority of trust schools holds 
when we control for the persistence of learning through a lagged value added model.  Although we 
have cross-section data, we observe three test scores for each student: SLC test score, send-off test 
score in the school’s own exam (conducted 3 to 6 months prior to the SLC exam) and also the end of 
year 9 test score. This allows us to construct a panel of three observations per student each for the year 
9 test score, send-off test score and the final SLC score. We then follow Andrabi et al. (2011) and Singh 
(2015) to estimate the following dynamic version of our model.  
24 
 
௜ܶ௧ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ଵܵூ௏௜ ൅ ܾଶܵଶூ௏௜ ൅ ܾଷܵଷூ௏௜ ൅ ܾସ ௜ܶ௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߛሺ݂ܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜௧  (9) 
where ௜ܶ௧ିଵ is the lagged test score for the i-th student in our sample.   
We estimate this model for both AE and RE scores along with the rural-urban split using the 
2004 sample for whom we can observe the grade 9 scores. The estimates of this model are given in 
Table A2 in Appendix. The estimated coefficient of the lagged score indicates 0.6% to 0.8% persistence 
of learning from grade 9 depending on the AE or RE scores and rural or urban regions. The persistence 
effects are small but statistically significant. As for individual types of school, we see that trust school 
students graduate with flying colours in most cases.  
 
Subject fixed effects. We rearrange the student-level data for 2004 to generate subject-level 
standardised scores for six compulsory SLC subjects for each student. This allows us to exploit the 
inter-subject variation in the test scores for a given student, thus eliminating student-level time-
invariant omitted factors, e.g., ability. The IV estimates for both AE and RE scores as well as for rural 
and urban areas are shown in Table A3 in Appendix.  
 These estimates, whether for national or rural-urban regions or for AE or RE, are pretty similar 
to the estimates of Table 4-6. Generally, the trust school is the most efficient school, followed by the 
company and other schools.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
Recent literature highlights the benefits of social motivation in the provision of public goods, especially 
when there are incentive problems. General failure of government schools, barring few exceptions, in 
providing quality schooling, especially in low income countries, is now well established (see Day 
Ashley et al., 2014; Chaudhury et al., 2006). In this context, the paper assesses the role of not-for-profit 
private schools in enhancing schooling performance. In doing so, the paper utilizes a unique database 
from Nepal and shows that the socially motivated trust schools do systematically better than the profit 
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motivated company schools, using 2SLS IV estimates.  
Our finding suggests that not-for-profit schools can present an ideal mode of delivering 
education in a low-income country. While for-profit schools can attract large private investment, they 
may not sustain high test performance.  
Clearly, our results have implications for contracting of service provision in the schooling sector 
where contracts are complex and likely to be incomplete. Therefore, policy makers and donors can be 
more confident if the contracted party can be trusted, even if the contract is incomplete and/or difficult 
to monitor. As such, these results recommend for increased funding of the not-for–profit private trust 
schools, something similar to the health sector as argued in Agg (2006).  
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Endnotes 
1 NGOs are important channels for health care (Reinikka & Svensson, 2010) and foreign aid (Agg, 2006). For the historical 
role of missionaries in spreading education in India and the British Empire see Castello-Climent, Chaudhary, and 
Mukhopadhyay (2016) and Jenz (2012), respectively. 
 
2 Caddell (2007a, 2007b) discuss how philanthropists and missionaries spread education in the country, which was once 
exclusive to the royal family and the elite. 
3 The full dataset contains over 11,000 observations. But due to missing values we lose nearly 1/3rd of these.  
4 Newhouse and Beegle (2006) attribute the success of the public schools to unobserved higher quality of inputs used in 
public schools. Chudgar and Quin (2012) show that low-fee paying private schools in India are no better than the public 
schools. They emphasize the need for recognizing heterogeneity among profit-motivated schools. 
5 Existing studies estimate the conventional test scores by school type (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2011) or voucher 
experiment as in the case of Muralidharan and Sundaram (2015) and then simply compare the average school expenditure 
per student by school types/voucher to identify the low cost school type. Use of the composite RE measure allows us to 
obtain marginal value for money for each school type.  
6 We exclude the repeaters because of different issues that may arise. We also drop the boarding students, because their 
school choice cannot be explained by the factors permitted by our data.  
7 The districts where the trust schools are located in are as follows: Kanchanpur (Far Western Development Region), 
Arghakhachi, Tanahun (Western Development Region), Kavrepala, Lalitpur, Dhanusha, Bhaktapur (Central Development 
Region), Saptari, Solukhumb, Udayapur, Jhapa (Eastern Development Region). Of these Kavrepala, Lalitpur and 
Bhaktapur districts have two schools each.   
8 The government schools are not free, except for girls and poor students.  
9 English-medium instruction is very common in most private schools, as Liechty (2003) notes: 'English proficiency is 
simultaneously the key to a better future, an index of social capital, and part of the purchase price for a ticket out of 
Nepal'.  
10 For more see the following website: http://www.educatenepal.com/institutions/detail/prabhat-english-higher-secondary-
school-mahakalishtan-bhaktapur 
11  
 Rural with Trust schools Rural without trust 
schools 
T-statistic 
Father school years 8 9 -1.40 
Mother school years 3.2 3.4 -0.2392 
Log(cash income) 1.73 1.72 0.2021 
Dalit 0.04 0.03 0.8482 
Wealth decile 5.77 5.51 1.1228 
 
 
12 We regress (separately) the presence of company and trust schools on total scores of the government schools. The 
coefficients for the company and the trust school are -0.0000602 and -0.0003 respectively, both significant at 1% level.     
13 This difference is statistically significant. 
14 We ignore the PA school for simplicity. 
15 In our sample, there are low-fee charging trust schools as well. 
16  ଶܻு ൏ ଶܻ௅ implies ሺி೅ିிುሻሺி೅ିிಸሻ
ఛುಹ
ఛ೅ಹ
ఛ೅ಽ
ఛಸ ൅
ሺிುିிಸሻ
ሺி೅ିிಸሻ
ఛುಹ
ఛ೅ಹ
൏1. The left-hand side of this inequality is a weighted average to two 
numbers, both of which are less than 1. 
17 The choice of our IVs is consistent with the literature not only for developed (Figlio and Ludwig, 2000), but also for 
developing countries (Alderman, Orazem, & Paterno, 2001; Newhouse and Beegle, 2006).  
 
18 The average score is 383 for Hindu students and slightly higher 390 for non-Hindu students and the difference is 
significant just at around 5%. 
19 An implicit assumption is that the same number of schools existed in the past when the parents made the school choice.  
 
20  Alternatively, private school students would score 0.039*0.22=0.0085 standard deviation (sd) higher than the 
corresponding government school students, where the multiplicative factor 0.22 is the ratio of sd of private school IV 
(0.2091) to sd of AE (0.95).   
                                                            
Appendix  
 
1. Social motivation of Trust schools 
Appendix Table 2A. Comparison of expenditure and salary per student across school types 
 (1) Rural (2) Urban (3) Rural (4) Urban 
VARIABLES Exp./student [1] Exp./student  Salary/student [1] Salary/student 
     
Trust Sch. 1.909** -1.026*** -0.490 -1.227*** 
 (0.908) (0.347) (0.717) (0.397) 
Company Sch. -0.371 -3.506*** -1.457** -1.794*** 
 (0.354) (0.509) (0.598) (0.424) 
PA Sch. -1.179*** -1.529*** -0.710*** -0.581*** 
 (0.095) (0.198) (0.108) (0.211) 
Age 0.020*** -0.086*** 0.017*** 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) 
Founder as head 2.390*** -0.160 1.244*** -0.181 
 (0.206) (0.172) (0.452) (0.484) 
Trained teachers 0.483*** 0.278 0.798*** 0.281** 
 (0.136) (0.237) (0.161) (0.113) 
Pupil per teacher -0.019*** -0.062*** -0.033*** -0.060*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) 
Parent teacher 
association 
-0.391*** -2.575*** -1.121*** -2.404*** 
 (0.138) (0.189) (0.224) (0.181) 
Rural - - - - 
     
Constant 3.524*** 12.380*** 4.381*** 6.988*** 
 (0.434) (0.733) (0.415) (0.582) 
VDC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4445 1,938 4367 2055 
R-squared 0.406 0.393 0.12 0.21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
[1] Expenditure/student and also salary per student are measured in 000 Nepalese Rp. 
 Here we regress school expenditure/salary per student on a set of school characteristics (as in Table 
2A) plus the dummies for trust, company and PA schools to account for any unobserved school 
specific characteristics for the full sample, which may also influence school expenditure and salary 
per student. The reference school category is the group of government schools.  
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Appendix Table 2B. Effect of school choice on further study after completing SLC 
 
 (1) (2) Rural (3) Urban 
VARIABLES studying Studying Studying 
    
Company school IV -0.101 0.0244 -0.247*** 
 (0.0665) (0.0818) (0.0804) 
Trust school IV 0.362* 0.642*** 0.0565 
 (0.209) (0.234) (0.214) 
PA school IV -0.0257 0.0966 -0.245** 
 (0.0738) (0.0958) (0.114) 
Rural  -0.0104 Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0231)   
Selection correction -0.0570*** -0.0379 -0.0804** 
 (0.0193) (0.0270) (0.0356) 
Constant 1.244*** 1.187*** 0.0428 
 (0.177) (0.235) (2.810) 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes 
SLC year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,821 1,612 1,209 
R-squared 0.063 0.074 0.088 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Other controls are as in Table 4a. 
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2. Robustness tests and Figures 
 
Table A1. School effects with the government and PA schools clubbed together 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AE AE RE RE 
     
Company Sch.  1.097***  0.771***  
 (0.036)  (0.046)  
Trust Sch. 1.035***  -0.122  
 (0.057)  (0.109)  
IV Company Sch.  2.136***  2.289*** 
  (0.129)  (0.194) 
IV Trust Sch.  5.434***  2.846** 
  (1.530)  (1.136) 
Constant 2.663*** 1.505*** 3.375*** 2.407*** 
 (0.210) (0.302) (0.652) (0.629) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District and year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 6,188 5,828 6,188 5,828 
R-squared 0.375 0.276 0.112 0.134 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A2. Lagged value added models: IV estimates of AE and RE 
 (1) All (2) Rural (3) Urban (4) All (5) Rural (6) Urban 
VARIABLES AE AE AE RE RE RE 
       
PA Sch. IV -0.014 -0.006 -0.031 0.044 0.013 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.036) (0.035) (0.021) 
Company Sch. IV -0.005 0.011** -0.018** -0.040 -0.049 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.036) (0.040) (0.011) 
Trust Sch. IV 0.029** 0.030** -0.009 0.107 0.082* -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.042) (0.079) (0.045) (0.038) 
Lagged score 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.014* 0.006 0.016 -0.019 0.007 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.034) (0.029) (0.022) (0.042) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
District & year 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2,336 1,568 768 2,336 1,568 768 
R-squared 0.690 0.636 0.788 0.289 0.325 0.581 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other control variables are as 
in Table 4.  
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Table A3. Subject FE estimates: IV estimates of efficiency 
 (1) All (2) Rural (3) Urban (4) All (5) Rural (6) Urban 
VARIABLES AE AE AE RE RE RE 
       
PA Sch. -0.109*** -0.064*** -0.242*** -0.072 -0.080 -0.244*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.041) (0.062) (0.078) (0.083) 
Company Sch. 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) 
Trust Sch. 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.018 0.060*** 0.052** -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.032) 
Constant 0.037*** 0.024*** 0.009 0.024 0.038* 0.022 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.028) (0.016) (0.021) (0.043) 
Other controls [1] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District & year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,446 9,014 4,432 13,446 9,014 4,432 
R-squared 0.629 0.634 0.643 0.235 0.239 0.347 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other control variables are as 
in Table 4.  
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3. IV identification strategy 
 
 
Figure 1. IV identification strategy 
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